Tor vs CJDNS/Hyperboria: Onion Routing vs Encrypted Mesh Networking

CJDNS (Caleb James DeLisle's Networking Suite) creates an encrypted mesh network where every node gets an IPv6 address derived from its public key. Traffic between nodes is encrypted end-to-end using the node's keys. Routing is through the mesh: packets travel through intermediate nodes, which can only decrypt and re-encrypt (not read content). Hyperboria is the largest deployment of CJDNS, a global mesh network with nodes in multiple countries. Every participant is a router, contributing to routing capacity. CJDNS provides encrypted, decentralized networking but does not provide IP anonymity - nodes know who is connecting to them (the connecting node's CJDNS IPv6 address is known, which can be correlated to physical identity).

CJDNS privacy: all traffic is encrypted (no eavesdropping by intermediate nodes), decentralized (no central servers to attack or subpoena), and resistant to mass passive surveillance of traffic content. However, CJDNS does not provide anonymity: the source CJDNS address of a connection is known to the destination. Your CJDNS address is derived from your public key, which is persistent. If your CJDNS identity is linked to your real identity (by any node you connected to previously), your connections can be traced. Tor privacy: provides source IP anonymity - the destination cannot determine your real IP address. Multi-hop routing means intermediate nodes cannot correlate source and destination. CJDNS is appropriate for secure decentralized networking between parties who trust each other or where anonymity is not needed. Tor is appropriate when anonymity is required.

CJDNS/Hyperboria excels for: building resilient local mesh networks (neighborhood networks that continue working if ISP connectivity is lost), secure communications between known parties without relying on centralized internet infrastructure, community networks in areas with limited or expensive ISP access, and decentralized application hosting on a mesh network. These use cases do not require anonymity from the network participants - they require encryption and decentralization. CJDNS also supports peering over existing internet connections (tunneled CJDNS), making it deployable without physical mesh infrastructure.

CJDNS performance: routing overhead is minimal (single encryption layer, direct mesh routing). Performance approaches direct internet speeds minus the encryption overhead. For mesh-connected nodes, latency depends on the physical path through the mesh. Over internet tunnels, latency is similar to a VPN (5-30ms overhead). CJDNS is suitable for latency-sensitive applications: VoIP, video, gaming, file transfers. Tor performance: 3-hop routing adds 100-500ms latency, 1-5 Mbps bandwidth typical. Not suitable for latency-sensitive real-time applications. For performance in private networking between known parties, CJDNS significantly outperforms Tor.

CJDNS provides the underlying encrypted mesh network; Tor can run over CJDNS for anonymity. A Tor relay running on a CJDNS-connected node benefits from CJDNS's encrypted routing for inter-relay communication. Tor Browser can be configured to connect to Tor through a CJDNS-reachable bridge. This combination provides: CJDNS's resistance to ISP surveillance of which nodes you connect to, and Tor's anonymity from those nodes. The practical complexity is significant - most users benefit more from using Tor directly with bridges than combining CJDNS and Tor.