Tor protects your network-level identity during transmission. Your ISP cannot see which websites you visit through Tor. The organization you are exposing cannot see your IP address when you access their systems through Tor or contact journalists through a Tor-accessible channel. The journalist receiving documents through SecureDrop cannot see your real IP address.
Tor does not protect you from:
Documents you submit that contain identifying metadata - Word documents with your name in author fields, PDFs with printer dots that identify the printer serial number, photos with GPS coordinates or device information in EXIF data. Always strip metadata before submission.
Behavioral patterns - If you only access whistleblowing resources during your lunch break on the work WiFi, correlation with your workplace network logs narrows the suspect pool regardless of Tor. Access sensitive resources from networks unconnected to your identity.
Account activity on the organization's internal systems - If you download documents from a corporate system while logged in as yourself, access logs record your activity regardless of what network you use for the submission itself.
Device compromise - If the organization has deployed monitoring software on work devices, all activity on those devices is logged locally. Never use work devices or work accounts for any whistleblowing-related activity.