obfs4 Bridge VPS for Belarusian Tor Users

The Belarusian state telecom Beltelecom implements DPI-based protocol fingerprinting plus active probing of suspected bridge IPs. The technical baseline is comparable to RKN. obfs4 with fresh IPs continues to defeat this in practice, particularly when distributed privately rather than via BridgeDB.

BY probing is somewhat less aggressive than RKN probing in volume but uses similar techniques. Bridge longevity profiles are similar to RU. The independent-media ecosystem in BY maintains established circumvention-tool distribution channels that operators can coordinate with.

For BY-targeted bridges, the best latency-vs-jurisdiction tradeoff is Romania (lowest latency, strong jurisdiction) or Ukraine (lowest latency, slightly higher risk). Iceland offers maximum jurisdictional distance at higher latency cost.

Avoid hosting bridges in EU member states that have unclear extradition framework with BY. We host bridges in our standard jurisdictions and have no cooperation pathway with BY law enforcement.

BridgeRelay 1
ORPort auto
ExtORPort auto
ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:443
Nickname AnubizBridgeBY01
ContactInfo bridge-tor@your-domain.example
PublishServerDescriptor 0
BridgeDistribution none

Same template as RU: private distribution only, no BridgeDB publication.

Signal, encrypted email through ProtonMail or Tutanota, onion-hosted Element rooms. Avoid Russian-controlled platforms (VK, Telegram in many configurations). The BY independent-media ecosystem maintains established distribution chains for circumvention tools; coordination with them often outperforms ad-hoc distribution.

Related: obfs4 bridge RU, webtunnel, meek, v3 onions UA, Tor hosting parent.